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Abstract: This paper uses the critical junctures framework developed by Hogan and Doyle
(2007) to determine if there were critical junctures in privatization policy in Brazil and
Argentina at the start of the 21st century. The framework constitutes a rigorous approach to the
identification of crisis, ideational change, and policy change. It is used to examine the
economic disasters in Brazil in 1999 and Argentina in 2001. Previously, we would have had to
wait decades before making such an assessment, as there were few tools with which to identify
critical junctures, and these were usually only effective long after the event.
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INTRODUCTION
For institutionalists (Gorges 2001; Mahoney 2000;
Pierson 2000) periods of abrupt change are generally
regarded as initiated by crises. This has resulted in
scholars differentiating the past into periods of
normalcy, and critical junctures. Despite critical
junctures importance to the analysis of temporal
processes, the concept has received limited attention
(Pierson, 2004). To address this weakness the paper
modifies, and improves upon, Hogan and Doyle’s
(2007) critical juncture framework.
This framework is built upon the hypothesis
that a crisis induced consolidation of a new idea –
replacing an extant paradigm – leads to significant
policy change. If this is the case, such a framework
would be capable of explaining why certain crises
lead to critical junctures in policies, whereas others
do not. The differentiating factor would be ideational
change, which would make identifying ideational
change a predictor of policy change.
Hogan and Doyle’s (2007) framework is
employed in examining the economic problems in
Brazil in 1999, and in Argentina in 2001, to test for
critical junctures in privatization policy. If crisis and
ideational change are identified, along with third
order policy change in privatization policy, the
framework would lead us to conclude there was a
critical junctures in privatization policy. Prior to this
framework being developed we would have had to
wait decades before making such a pronouncement.
SECTION 1: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
CRITICAL JUNCTURES CONCEPT
Development paths funnel units in particular
directions, with the consequence of increasing
returns, and resultant irreversibilities (Mahoney,
2003: 53; Pierson and Skocpol, 2002: 9). Critical
junctures constitute branching points that set
processes of change in motion, resulting in the
adoption of an institutional arrangement from among
alternatives (Mahoney, 2000: 512). Views vary as to
the duration of a critical juncture. For some it
constitutes a brief period in which one direction or
another is taken, while for others, it is an extended
period (Mahoney 2001). The concept has been
employed in comparative politics. Both Collier and
Collier (1991) and Mahoney (2001) used similar
frameworks in their analyses of developments in
Latin and Central America. For them, critical
junctures took decades to come about, while their
after effects were of shorter duration. Hogan (2005;
2006) questioned whether these periods of change
were in fact incremental, and should be considered
examples of conversion as developed by Streeck and
Thelen (2005).
In relation to short term change, Haggard
(1988: 91) argued that economic depression brought

into question existing institutions, and resulted in
dramatic change. Garrett and Lange (1995: 628)
showed that electoral landslides created critical
junctures by producing mandates for policy change.
Casper and Taylor (1996) employed the concept in
analyzing liberalization of authoritarian regimes, while
Hogan’s (2005; 2006) remoulded framework was used
to examine change in trade union influence over public
policy
Critical junctures are regarded as highlighting
the importance of the past in explaining the present.
They ‘suggest the importance of focusing on the
formative moments for institutions’ (Pierson, 1993:
602).
But, these studies are all postdictive,
concentrating on history. If focusing on the formative
moments of institutions and policies is critical, only
doing so long afterwards is a significant weakness for
the concept.
These limitations have led to the
development of the framework tested here.
SECTION
2:
CRITICAL
JUNCTURE
FRAMEWORK
The framework developed by Hogan and Doyle (2007)
consists of three sections. The first section is devoted
to examining macroeconomic conditions to determine if
there was a crisis. In this case we employ double (20)
the number of observables implications set out in the
original framework. This is to add veracity to the
nature of our findings. The second section of the
framework is designed to identify ideational change. It
is made up of two subsections, to identify extant
ideational collapsed and to identify new ideational
consolidation.
Here there are eight observable
implications. The third, and final, section of the
framework is structured to identify the nature of policy
change. This is made up of three observables, all of
which are derived from Hall’s (1993) three orders of
policy change. If a case study satisfies the observables
in all three sections of the framework then there is a
critical juncture.
Ideational change is the link between crisis
and policy change. The nature of the ideational change,
in the wake of a crisis, will determine the type of policy
change that occurs. Thus, through understanding
ideational change, the framework aims to explain why
only some crises are followed by radical changes in
policies.
Hogan and Doyle (2007) argue that in the
absence of ideational change the level of policy change,
in response to crisis will be of the first or second order,
but not the third.1 Policy instrument settings, and the
instruments themselves may change, but without
ideational change the hierarchy of goals underpinning
policy will remain unaltered. In this manner, a crisis
can be examined to see if it has led to change in the
ideas underpinning policy. If ideational change is
discovered then radical policy change can be predicted,
2

if ideational is not discovered, then something less
than radical policy change is likely. Therefore,
Hogan and Doyle’s (2007) framework contains
within it a predictive element.
Previously, we would have had to wait
decades after a crisis before declaring if a critical
juncture in policy had occurred. With the framework
utilised here that waiting time is eliminated.
SECTION 3: RESEARCH QUESTION AND
METHODOLOGY
Research Question
The research objective is to determine if there were
critical junctures in the privatization policy of Brazil
and Argentina at the start of the 21st century. This
will be determined using Hogan and Doyle’s (2007)
critical junctures framework. The central hypothesis
is ideational change, in the wake of a crisis, leads to
radical policy change. We must ascertain whether
the difficulties in those economies were crises, if
crises are confirmed did they led to ideational change
with regard to privatization, and, if ideational change
is confirmed, did this led to a radical change in
privatization policy.
Case Selection, Time Frame, Privatization Policy
Latin America is turning left (Castañeda, 2006).
‘Political parties, which can broadly be characterised
as being from the left and the centre left are in power,
have been in power or have good chances of gaining
power’ (Panizza, 2005: 716-717), at national, state
and municipal levels. The reasons for this are not
particularly complex, given the region’s unparalleled
socio-economic inequalities, and persistent levels of
indigence, that have become increasingly associated
with the last quarter century of neoliberal
restructuring and democratic reform (ECLAC, 2005).
However, this political development has also seen the
emergence of politicians and political movements
exhibiting many characteristics of ‘classical’ era
populism – advocacy of economic nationalism,
redistributive social policies, and increased stateintervention in the economy.2
What merits attention is that the apparent
resurgence of the left in the region has occurred along
to two lines – the radical populist left and the
reformist left (Castañeda 2006; Panizza 2005). The
latter was the radical orthodox left that successfully
reconstructed in accordance with the new political
realities of neoliberal globalisation. Responding to
popular demands, it seeks to mitigate the negative
excesses of the neoliberal model through gradual
reform and regulation. This raises questions as to
why in some cases the region witnessed the
emergence of reformist left-of-centre forces, while in

others it saw an apparent return to the populist policies
of the past.
Economic crisis is a proxy for “generative
cleavages” as it render politics highly fluid (Garrett,
1993: 522), generating debates concerning economic
models, which can lead to radical ideas to replace
existing paradigms. As such, economic crises may be a
crucial independent variable explaining the reemergence of populism in the region. Thus, the
economic situations in Brazil (1999), and Argentina
(2001), are examined. In Brazil, President Luiz Inácio
Lula de Silva of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT –
Workers Party), has been characterised as belonging to
the more moderate reformist left, while his counterpart
in Argentina, Nestor Kirchner, is frequently accused of
old style populism (Castañeda, 2006; Panizza, 2005).
Change in privatization policy is focused upon as it is a
core tenet of conservative economic restructuring.
Change in such a policy may indicate wider changes in
macroeconomic policy.
SECTION
4.1:
IDENTIFICATION
OF
MACROECONOMIC CRISIS
The critical junctures literature is invested with the
concept of crisis. This places ‘particular emphasis on
the tensions leading up to a critical juncture’ (Collier
and Collier, 1991: 32). Any of a range of external
shocks are cited as explanations for policy change
(Greener, 2001; Golob, 2003: 373).
Crises tend to be rare events rendering
definition and identification difficult (Yu et al., 2006:
439). Consequently, how do we identify a crisis?
Stone (1989: 299) argues that a situation does not
become a problem until it is regarded as controllable.
But, if something is controllable it must be measurable,
otherwise how would we know if we are controlling it?
Thus, a crisis must be quantifiable. Kaminsky et al.,
(1998) and Berg and Pattillo (1999) advocated
individual variables when quantifying currency crises.
Pei and Adesnik (2000: 138-139) developed a broader
range of criteria for identifying macro-economic crises:
annual inflation rate greater than 15 per cent, stagnant
or negative annual gross domestic product (GDP)
growth, and historians and other analysts’ descriptions
of significant deterioration in economic and financial
circumstances. For Garuba (2006: 21), Kwon (2001:
105), and Solimano (2005: 76) a macro-economic crisis
can be identified through the general indicators and
perceptions of growth, inflation, employment creation,
poverty reduction, and their combined sociopsychological burden on society. Here we seek to
identify macroeconomic crises with greater certainty,
through the use of quantitative and qualitative
measures.
Defining anything as a crisis, including a
macro-economic downturn, requires subjective and
objective deliberations (Pei and Adesnik, 2000: 139).
3

Consequently, González (2005: 93) suggests the
adoption of a multifaceted approach. Agents must
diagnose, and impose on others, their notion of a
crisis before action to resolve uncertainty can take
meaningful form (Blyth 2002: 9). This fits with
Hay’s (1999: 321) perception of a crisis as the
triumph of a simplifying ideology. Consequently, we
develop a broad range of observable implications,
which include, and build upon, the objective and
subjective criteria of previous studies. These twenty
observable implications accept that a macroeconomic crisis constitutes a severe economic low
point (See Appendix A for observables). We argue
that at least 50 per cent of all observable
implications, for which there are findings, should
point to economic crisis.
Brazil - Crisis: 1998-2000
Brazil undertook an inflation stabilization programme
in 1994, the Plano Real (Netto, 1999), pegging the
real to the dollar. This reduced inflation from 50 per
cent per month to 3.2 per cent annually by 1998
(Figure 1). However, there was substantial exchange
rate appreciation during this period, making Brazilian
goods relatively more expensive, contributing to an
alarming current account deficit by 1997 (BulmerThomas, 1999: 730).
Figure 1: Inflation;
Openness; Imports

Unemployment;

Trade

Source: Banco Central do Brasil
However, the government, with an eye to the 1998
elections, failed to make good on its commitments, and
the budget deficit grew to 8.4 per cent of GDP. As a
result debt/GNI increased to almost 32 per cent by the
end of 1999 (Figure 3).
Figure 3: Debt Services (% of exports of goods and
services; Total Debt (% of GNI)
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Interest rates doubled as the repercussions of the
Asian crisis reached Brazil (Figure 2), indicating the
fragility of its financial situation (Heymann, 2001:
16). At the same time, inflation began rising again,
reaching almost 5 per cent by 1999. Nevertheless,
the authorities promised a new assault on fiscal
problems, now aggravated by higher interest
payments on government debt.
Figure 2: Brazilian Interest Rates 1995-2006

But, following the Asian crisis, and Russian bond
default, investors became risk averse (Kaminsky et al.,
2003: 51), this evidenced by Standard and Poor’s,
Moody’s and Fitch’s downgrading of Brazil’s credit
rating (Table1). By 1999 Brazil was not considered a
safe bet in terms of investment, although it improved
somewhat subsequently.
As $30 billion fled the country in September,
the central bank raised interest rates to 43 per cent.
Unemployment reached 9 per cent by the end of 1998,
while imports, and trade openness declined. President
Fernando Cardoso, safely re-elected, announced
measures to slash the deficit, restore confidence, and
right the economy.3
However, the real came under attack in
October 1998. A $41 billion IMF-led rescue package
was arranged in November.4 But, President Cardoso
was unable to get an IMF supported budget (tax
increases/spending cuts) through the legislature.5 The
possibility of debt default arose. As much of the
4

country’s foreign debt was short term this was a
daunting burden.6 The upper classes, convinced
devaluation of the real was inevitable, began
withdrawing investment from Brazil. The fall in
gross capital formation for 1998 reflected this (Figure
4).
Table 1: Credit Ratings
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
B2
B1
B1
B1
B2
B1
Moody's
B+
B+
BBB+
B+
BBS&P
BB- BB- BBB
B+
BBFitch
Source: Moody's Investor's Service; Standard &
Poor's;
Fitch
IBCA;
at
http://www.latinfocus.com/latinfocus/countries/brazil
As dollars fled the country, and FDI went elsewhere,
the prospects for the economy, and the value of the
real, grew bleak.
To defend the currency, the central bank
pushed to 50 per cent,7 increasing the cost of
servicing public and private debt, to the extent
investors became convinced a default was coming, to
be followed by a currency collapse. Consequently,
high interest rates, instead of slowing the tide of
dollars leaving Brazil, accelerated the process. When
the governor of Minas Gerais announced a 90 day
moratorium on repayments to the federal government
the game was up.8 This announcement, and fear that
the governors of Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do
Sul could do likewise, threatened the country’s fiscal
integrity (Rothkopf, 1999: 91). Foreign investors
fled Brazilian capital markets (Cattaneo, 2001: 228).
With the central bank losing $2 billion a day,9 the
World Bank initiated crisis talks.10
Figure 4: Gross Capital Formation; FDI inward
stock; FDI Inflows; Current Account Balance

1999: 279). While the real/dollar exchange rate had
been close to parity prior to devaluation, it plummeted
to two for one by February. Debt services as a
percentage of exports almost doubled, rising to 120 per
cent by 1999 (Figure 3). The decision to devalue
damaged the government’s credibility, putting severe
pressure on the central bank, whose diminished foreign
currency
reserves
were
preventing
another
devaluation.12 However, devaluation did not stop the
hemorrhage of dollars. The inflow of FDI, and FDI
inward stock, both declined in 1999, relative to
previous years, reflecting a loss in investment (Figure
4). Paul Krugman warned that Brazil was at risk from
anyone who could take money out of the country.13
The Sao Paulo stock exchange plunged 10 per
cent on the day of devaluation. However, within a few
weeks this policy collapsed, forcing the resignation of a
second central bank governor. Arminio Fraga, the new
governor, floated the currency.14 There was widespread
fear of a return to the high inflation of the 1980s, and a
default on public debts (Bulmer-Thomas, 1999: 729).
The country experienced significant declines in
industrial output and GNP.15 The percentage of the
population below the poverty line surpassed 25 per
cent.16 The New York Times – observing that Brazil
was in crisis, with capital fleeing, and state
governments defying the central authority17 – predicted
a debt default.18 Yet, most indicators of economic
performance did not reach decade long lows (Figure 5).
In fact, real GDP grew in 1998, albeit by only 0.1 per
cent, and grew by 0.8 per cent the following year.
However, GDP was to rise by 4.5 per cent in 2000,
while the highest inflation rate in 2000 was 7 per cent.19
GNI per capita growth stagnated between 1998 and
1999, before gradually recovering.20
Figure 5: GDP Growth(%); GDP per capita
growth(%); GDP growth(5 yr. av); GNI per capita
growth (%)
7

160

4
3

GDP per capita
growth %

FDI Inflows (%
Change)

2

GDP Growth (ave.
last 5 yrs)

1

GNI per Capita
Growth (%)

03
20

01
20

99
19

97
19

-40

19

19

93

-20

95

0

Current Account
Balance (% of GDP)

-60

0
-1

20
05

20

20
03

40

20
01

60

GDP growth (%)

19
99

80

FDI Inward Stock (%
Change)

5

19
97

100

6

19
95

120

Gross Capital
Formation (% of
GDP)

19
93

140

-2

Source: Data Gob, Government Indicators Database

Source: Data Gob, Government Indicators Database

Despite pledges not to,11 the exchange rate
band was widened to accommodate a modest
devaluation in January 1999 (Roett and Crandall,

‘Many commentators in the first half of 1999 assumed
that Brazil would have to restructure its debt (a
euphemism for default)’ (Bulmer-Thomas, 1999: 736).
5

Summers (2000: 5) rated the situation as a major
financial crisis. By early March the Brazilian central
bank was still struggling to prop up the real.21
However, the bank’s framework for targeting
inflation made progress, and it regained credibility.
Economist Henry Kaufman argued that Brazil's
problems were a reflection of slowing international
economic activity.22 For investment strategist Barton
Briggs the devaluation was part of a creeping
deflation.23
Yet, by the middle of the year the real had
recovered. Inflation did not rise, nor output fall, by
as much as expected, while interest rates gradually
declined (Heymann, 2001: 16). By August financial
analysts were predicting the economy would contract
by 1 per cent, compared with earlier estimates of 5
per cent.24 Hakim (2000: 110) argues that the
country succeeded far beyond anyone’s expectations
in recuperating from the crisis. This success was
reflected in the citizens’ opinions of their
government’s performance and its level of
corruption, with them rating its effectiveness as 0.1825, only slightly below the world average of 0,
and its corruption at 0.0426, slightly above the world
average of 0 (Figure 6).
Figure 6: Governmental
Corruption Measures
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resulted in the overvaluation of the peso, especially in
relation to the Brazilian real. While Argentine exports
declined, imports increased, and the national debt,
denominated in dollars, grew rapidly.
After recovering from a short recession
following the 1995 Mexican crisis, Argentina’s
economy was hit again in 1998. International financial
turmoil in the wake of the Asian crisis, and anxiety over
the Brazilian economy, resulted in high interest rates
(Figure 7), a stock market plunge, and slow growth.27
According to The Economist the Argentine economy
shrunk by 3.2 per cent in 1999.28 The national debt,
denominated in dollars, double between 1993 and 2001
(Mulraine, 2005: 7). But, hailed as an example of free
market reforms, Argentina was permitted to further
indebt itself. By the late 1990s Argentina was facing a
dilemma. To break the link with the dollar and permit
the peso depreciate would improve the country’s export
situation, but would drive the national debt higher.
Figure 7: Argentine interest rates 1995-2006

and

Brazil
(Effectiveness)
Brazil (Corruption)

Source: Data Gob, Government Indicators Database
Summers and Williamson (2001: 56) argued the
central problem for Brazil was a pegged exchange
rate that lacked the measures necessary to make the
peg stick.
Although Brazil avoided economic
prostration, as it is Argentina’s main trading partner
meant the depreciation of the real left the peso, also
pegged to the dollar, overvalued. This was to have
devastating consequences for Argentina (Kamensky
et al., 2002: 52).
Argentina - Crisis: 1999-2002
For most the 1990s the Argentine peso was pegged to
the dollar. During these years the dollar appreciated
in against other currencies, and so did the peso. This

Source: Banco Central de la República Argentina.
In early 2000 the government began cutting spending
and increasing taxes, to close the budget gap (Saxton,
2003: 10) which had reached 3.8 per cent (Desai, 2003:
177). The government bet the contradictory effects of
its decision would be offset by the boost to confidence
from putting the public finances in order – allowing
interest rates to fall. However, this ignored the fact that
the economy was shrinking, and would result in further
reducing the already diminishing tax base. As it was
deficit spending that “got Argentina into its mess,” in
the first place,29 the tax increases, instead of reviving
the economy, drove it into stagnation.30 There was,
according to Fronti et al., (2002: 12), a genuine crisis of
economic fundamentals. In November 2000, Standard
& Poor’s downgraded Argentina’s credit rating to BB-,
suggesting it faced major uncertainties regarding its
capacity to meet its financial commitments. Moody
and Fitch soon did likewise (Table 2). By late 2000 the
country was experiencing economic stagnation and
political confusion.31
6

Table 2: Credit Ratings
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
B1
Ca
Ca Caa1 Caa1
Moody's B1
BB
BBSD
SD
SD
SD
S&P
BB
BB DDD DDD DDD DDD
Fitchl
Source: Moody's Investor's Service; Standard &
Poor's; Fitch IBCA; at http://www.latinfocus.com/latinfocus/countries/argentina/argeiratings.
htm
Surveys discovered pessimism about the economy,
with 32 per cent of people believing they would be
worse off in 12 months.32 This mood darkened as
tension increased between Argentina and the IMF
(Eichengreen, 2003: 75). Financial analyst Mailson
da Nobrega argued that “the crisis in Argentina has
become permanent.”33 If the peso was kept pegged to
the dollar exports would continue to fall, and the
national debt continue to grow. If the peso was
unpegged from the dollar its value might collapse,
and although exports would grow, the national debt
would explode. In late 2001 capital flight reached 6
per cent of GDP, and the government found itself
increasingly unable to meet debt repayments
(Kaminsky et al., 2003: 63). On 30 November $1.3
billion fled the banks, and the central bank’s net
reserves slumped by $1.7 billion.34 The slump in
gross capital formation, and the reversal of FDI
inflows (Figure 8) bears witness to the declining
attractiveness of Argentina as an investment option.
With the effective freezing of bank accounts on 1
December, to stop the run on the banks, the crisis
exploded onto the streets. Bonelli (2004: 216) points
out that billions of dollars of investment had left the
country.
Figure 8: Gross Capital Formation; FDI inward
stock; FDI Inflows; Current Account Balance
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The Wall Street Journal described the situation in
Argentina as chaos.35 The Independent declared
Argentina to be in political and economic

meltdown.36 When Argentine daily Pagina/12 declared
the country to be locked in crisis, it began receiving
calls from politicians to reign in its headlines.37 By this
stage economics and finance ministers began
resigning.38 Following violent protests, in which many
were injured and killed, the government collapsed in
late December. Now, recession, crushing debt, and
political paralysis, assumed epic proportions.39 Citizens
declining confidence in their government was reflected
in the effectiveness index falling from 0.28 in 2000,
well above the world average of 0, to -0.47 in 2002
(Figure 9).
While Argentines regarded their
government as somewhat corrupt in 2000, with a score
of -0.34, this had fallen to -0.78 by 2002. Starr
described the Argentine economy as being driven into
the ground,40 while De Rosa pointed out that the reason
for the crisis was government spending, which outpaced
revenue collection,41 partly due to enormous
corruption.42
Figure 9: Governmental Effectiveness and Corruption
Measures
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President de la Rua’s successor Ramón Puerta was in
office two days when succeeded by Adolfo Saa. Saa
declared a debt moratorium, but a few days later
Argentina announced the biggest default in history $132 billion.43 By this time unemployment had
surpassed 18 per cent.44 Saa then announced the
creation of a new currency, the Argentino, a solution to
the shortage of cash. However, this currency never
came into being. Saa was in office two days when
replaced by Eduardo Camaño, who lasted just three. In
January 2002 new President Duhalde unpegged the
peso from the dollar, and it promptly lost 75 per cent of
its value, triggering rapid inflation (Gurter, 2004). This
had an immediate impact on the remaining debt, which
tripled in value. The jump in inflation between 2001
and 2002 was dramatic, climbing from -0.17 to almost
26 per cent (Figure 10). Imports of goods and services
slumped, reflected in the declining trade openness.
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Figure 11: Debt Services (% of exports of goods and
services; Total Debt (% of GNI)
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All the while the central bank, struggling to stabilize
the currency’s value,45 spent vast amounts of foreign
exchange (Desai, 2003: 173). ‘Because most debt
instruments in Argentina were denominated in
dollars, the depreciation of the [peso] made it
impossible for borrowers to earn sufficient money to
repay their dollar-denominated loans’ (Cavlo and
Mishkin, 2003: 101). The depreciation of the peso
also diminished gross national income. Thus, despite
the debt default, and the fall in debt services as a
percentage of exports from 70 per cent in 2000 to just
above 40 per cent in 2001, the remaining debt as a
percentage of GNI increased dramatically, reaching
160 per cent. That both indicators in Figure 11
simultaneously veered dramatically in opposite
directions is a clear indication of a troubled economy.
The financial sector had gone into meltdown.
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19

03

01

05
20

20

20

99
19

97
19

95
19

19

93

Imports of Goods and
Services (% of GDP)

97

Trade Openess

19

Unemployment %

95

Inflation %

Daseking et al., (2004: 1) argued it was one of the worst
economic crisis in the country’s history, a view echoed
by many economists (de la Torre et al., 2002; Feldstein
2002; Mussa 2002).
After an initially populist line, President
Duhalde sought to work towards a solution with the
IMF. But, the political response to the crisis, and the
actions of the five presidents who dealt with it, was
chaotic. By early 2002, Argentina was in the midst of a
depression.48 GDP growth, and GDP per capita growth
were both down over 10 per cent (Figure 12). These
declines were mirrored in the decline of GNI per capita
growth, and GDP growth averaged over five years.
Real GDP fell by 28 per cent between 1998 and 2002,
while real wages declined by 23.7 per cent, inflation
reached 41 per cent, and unemployment peaked at 23.6
per cent (Saxton, 2003: 1).
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In 2002 the number of people below the poverty line
doubled to 60 per cent, while growth contracted by 4.4
per cent.49 All measures of economic performance had
sunk beyond decade long lows. It was a crisis of
unprecedented financial turmoil, and a shocking drop in
output (Guidotti, 2006). For Zanetta (2004: 176) this
constituted the utter collapse of Argentina’s economy.
For Miller et al., (2005: 1) a ‘full-blown financial crisis
where the collapse of the exchange rate and the
paralysis of the banking system precipitated an
Argentine Great Depression.’
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The public was enraged over the economic mess,
soaring unemployment, and the disappearance of
their savings.46 An indication of how negatively they
regarded the economy, and their suspicions of
political corruption, was the clamour for dollars.47
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Table 3 – The Identification of Macroeconomic
Crisis
The Observable Implications
O1. Main GDP indicators stagnant/negative?
O2. GNI per capita PPP growth stagnant/negative?
O3. 50% + of population below poverty line?
O4. Total debt above 100 of GNI?
O5. Debt services exceed 100% of exports?
O6. Importations and trade openness declined?
O7. FDI inflows, and FDI inward stock decline?
O8. Gross capital formation as % of GDP declined?
O9. Annual inflation greater than 15%?
O10. Annual interest greater than 15%?
O11. Annual unemployment greater than 15%?
O12. Decline in sovereign credit rating?
O13. Corruption and gov. effectiveness problematic?
O14. Opinion polls regard the economy in crisis?
O15. Media regard economy in crisis?
O16. Commentators regard economy in crisis?
O17. Central bank regard economy in crisis?
O18. Domestic/international orgs regard economy in crisis?
O19. Politicians regard economy in crisis?
O20. Gov. pronouncements on economy consistent with crisis
management approach?
Economic Crisis
From Table 3 it is clear that Argentina (1999-2002),
satisfied nearly all above observable implications (95
per cent) for macroeconomic crisis. Brazil (19982000) satisfied half of the twenty observable
implications, and therefore also constituted an
economic crisis. The next section examines both
periods of economic difficulty for changes in the
ideas underlying privatization policy.

4.2 IDENTIFICATION OF IDEATIONAL
CHANGE
Previous policies are discredited due to their
implication in a crisis (Levy, 1994). Although
economic crises can have great impact they will not
determine policy, whose formulation is ‘centred in
domestic political and ideational processes’ (Golob,
2003: 375). Ideas determine policy choices due to
uncertainty over the workings of the macro-economy,
the difficulties of interpreting policy effectiveness,
and the lack of agreement over what constitutes
“correct” macro-economic policy (McNamara, 1998:
57). When an economic model is in difficulty,
windows of opportunity (Kingdon, 1995) appear in
which change agents contest the viability of the
prevailing paradigm. They present new ideas to
replace the ones upon which existing policy is based.
We contend that significant policy change depends
on actors reaching consensus upon, and subsequently

Argentina 99-02

Brazil 98-00

X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
YES

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
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consolidating around, a particular set of new ideas.
These ideas determine the path of subsequent policy, as
policy-makers work within a framework of ideas and
standards that specify not only the goals of policy, but
the instruments to be used to achieve these goals, and
the nature of the problems they are addressing (Hall,
1993: 279). ‘Ideas facilitate the reduction of…barriers
by acting as coalition-building resources among agents
who attempt to resolve the crisis’ (Blyth, 2002: 37).
They are the casual mechanisms of change in any
critical juncture (Golob, 2003).
Once agents coalesce around a set ideas
purporting to offer a solution to current economic woes,
and an alternative to the current paradigm, they attempt
to ‘inject’ these into the policy domain. We contend
there are three groupings of change agents. The most
important are what Dahl (1961) termed ‘political
entrepreneurs.’ They are similar to Kingdon’s (1995)
concept of policy entrepreneurs, which constitute our
second group of change agents. Policy entrepreneurs
encompass civil servants, technocrats, academics,
economists and interest groups etc., who engage in
policy innovation, and have access to decision makers.
Policy entrepreneurs are responsible for producing
ideas, but the political entrepreneur injects these into
the policy process. The final group of change agents
are outside influences, including the media, and
international organizations, such as the OECD. They
9

critique an existing economic paradigm, advocating a
new set of ideas as an alternative.
Should a broad range of agents agree the
prevailing paradigm is inadequate, and should be
replaced, the first stage of Legro’s (2000: 419) model
of ideational change, collapse, will have occurred.
Five observable implications seek to identify the
generation of new economic ideas and extant
ideational collapse (See Appendix B). However,
‘even when ideational collapse occurs, failure to
reach consensus on a replacement could still produce
continuity, as society reflexively re-embraces the old
orthodoxy’ (Legro 2000: 424). In the wake of
ideational collapse, the issue is reaching consensus
on a new set of ideas. If consensus is achieved it
constitutes the second stage of Legro’s model –
consolidation – agents co-ordinating a replacement
set of ideas to the reigning consensus. This can be
seen in political entrepreneurs consolidating their
innovations’ by combining a mixture of interests to
produce a winning coalition (Sheingate 2003: 192193). Three observable implications seek to identify
new ideational consolidation (See Appendix B).
Brazil – The Armouring of a Policy
Privatization was initially considered in Brazil in
1979, when the government created the National
Program for Public Sector Rationalisation. It was not
until the implementation of the National Plan for
Privatization (PND) in 1990 that the process was
kick-started (Mueller, 2001). In July 1981, the
military
government
attempted
to
initiate
privatization, passing legislation for transferring
public companies to the private sector.
A
commission was created to oversee this process
(Werneck, 1991). However, as foreign investors
were barred, only 20 state-owned companies were
privatised. The World Bank described this effort as a
‘classical example of failure’ (Treisman, 2003: 100).
In November 1985, with the creation of the
Interministerial Privatization Council, the legal
impediment to foreign investors was removed, and
the Banco National de Desenvolvimento Econômico e
Social (BNDES) was given a central role in the
process. This was crucial, as an economist at the
bank, Ignácio Rangel proved highly influential in
disseminating the benefits of privatization to
powerful interest groups (Werneck, 1991: 62).
However, the process stalled, and in 1988 it
appeared this policy would go no further with the
creation of a new constitution which restricted
privatization and created state monopolies in
telecommunications, oil, and gas (Treisman, 2003).
However, as neoliberal ideas, and policy
prescriptions, gained salience, President Collor de
Mello, and his successor Itamar Franco, began
attacking nationalist economic policies. Economic

ideas were used to attack the statist economic paradigm:
‘We have a government that is too large.’50 Eventually
Collor de Mello pushed through the PND, and the idea
of privatization was slowly institutionalised.
Ironically, it was under President Cardoso, a
social democrat, that privatization became widely
accepted.
With the PND now institutionalised,
privatization was implemented aggressively. Cardoso,
desperate to banish hyperinflation, adopted many
neoliberal policy prescriptions. Between 1994 and
1999 the state divested itself of 124 companies.51 By
1998 ‘the entire telecommunications and railway
sectors, the largest ports, some of the main highways,
much of the electricity distribution and generation
sectors, and some water and sanitation services had
been transferred to private control’ (Treisman, 2003:
94). Mueller (2001) argues that privatization had
become so embedded due to judicial independence, and
the autonomy of regulatory bodies, that it would be
extremely difficult for an administration to reverse
course.
Brazil – Any Ideas out There?
Following the devaluation of the real in 1999 and the
subsequent economic crisis, there was widespread
disillusionment with the economic model. Only 25 per
cent of Brazilians expressed satisfaction with the
market economy,52 and privatization policy, in
particular, lost significant support. Only 26 per cent
felt satisfied with the level of public services after
privatization, while support for privatization dropped to
33 per cent by 2003.53
The PT, and their Presidential candidate Luiz
Inácio Lula de Silva, began attacking conservative
economic policies during the 2003 election. Lula’s
platform was built upon a promise to tackle the social
and economic ills generated by this model:
If at one time during the 1990s the current
model was able to awaken hope of
economic and social progress, today we are
left with an enormous feeling of deception.
Now after eight years of this model, the
Brazilian people have determined that the
fundamental promises have not been
fulfilled and their hopes only frustrated…
The dominant feeling … is that the actual
model has exhausted itself [Lula, 2002: 1].54
During the election Lula’s energy advisor, Luiz
Pinguelli Rosa announced that ‘the period of
neoliberalism is gone in Brazil. The privatization phase
has come to an end.’55 Furthermore, Lula pledged to
take a tougher regulatory line with privatised
companies,56 and probe controversial privatizations.57
Lula, and running mate José Alencar, expressed doubts
about the extent of privatization conducted in Brazil.58
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Although dissatisfaction with neoliberalism,
and privatization, emanated from the PT and Lula,
there was a lack of public support for this policy.
Consequently, a mild form of ideational collapse
occurred. However, although Lula constituted a
change agent, he failed to present any alternative
policy in lieu of state divestiture. He did not promote
renationalisation, mainly to calm the markets.
Instead, Lula called for an end to outright
privatization (unremarkable, considering there was
little left to sell), and rather, made commitments to
increase state involvement in certain sectors. No
alternative idea was presented to replace privatization
as policy. New ideational consolidation did not
occur.
Argentina – The Armouring of a Policy
Argentina is renowned for aggressive privatization.
After a considerable amount of re-privatization in the
1970s59 a hiatus was reached.60 It was not until the
election of Raul Alfonsín that privatization was
reconsidered (González-Fraga, 1991). Alfonsín’s
first attempt at privatization came with the creation of
Commission 414, to professionally manage the
process (González-Fraga, 1991: 78). Progress was
slow, leading Alfonsín to launch the Ministry of
Growth in 1985, claiming privatization was needed
‘to get maximum work productivity.’61 The Ministry
was responsible for stimulating private sector growth
in areas traditionally reserved for the public sector.
This, combined with the creation of the Directorio de
Empresas Públicas (DEP), was expected to divest
Argentine of burdensome companies, enabling debt
repayments, reducing public sector deficits and
tightening fiscal policy (González-Fraga, 1991: 78).
However, only four state-owned enterprises were
privatised, and the policy was deemed a failure
(Treisman, 2003).
Carlos Menem accelerated privatization.
Menem, like many contemporary regional leaders,
adopted conservative economic ideas, and translated
them into policy. He was determined to reduce the
role of the state, and ‘privatise everything
privatisable’ (Treisman, 2003: 96). With anti-state
feelings rising following 1989’s hyperinflation, and
with
monetarist-based
conservative
policies
presenting an alternative economic paradigm, popular
approval for privatization soared (Goldstein, 1998).
For Menem, eager to tighten fiscal policy and reduce
budget deficits, privatization appeared ideal. He
began to institutionalise privatization policy, first
with the Economic Emergency Law, declaring a state
of emergency in the public sector, and more
importantly, the Public Sector Reform Law, which
specifically allowed for privatization (Goldstein,
1998).
This law empowered the executive to
privatise state-owned enterprises without Congress’s

approval (Treisman, 2003), embedding privatization as
a legal and acceptable policy.
Menem began privatizations with the sale of
telecom company ENTEL in 1990. However, the
transaction became mired in allegations of corruption,
and it was not until appointment of Domingo Cavallo as
Economy Minister, that privatization, as policy, became
embedded (Goldstein, 1998). Cavallo instituted a range
of liberalising structural reforms as he set out to ‘shock
the economy.’ He made the dollar legal tender, pushed
for greater efficiency in tax collection, removed trade
barriers by joining the Mercosur, and promised to sell
all state-owned enterprises by 1992 (Goldstein, 1998).
Although the 1992 deadline was missed, between 1991
and 1994, Menem and Cavallo privatised over 90 per
cent of state enterprises (Treisman, 2003). Between
1988 and 2001, Argentina sold 171 state companies.62
By 2000, privatization had become institutionalised as
state policy.
Argentina – Ideas to Pierce the Armour
Following the economic crisis, and subsequent political
and social turmoil, there was widespread criticism of
the economic model, which was perceived to be at the
heart of the crisis. Privatization, a tenet of conservative
economic restructuring, received particular attention as
a major force behind Argentina’s woes. Consequently,
critiques of government policy became widespread, and
opinion turned against privatization.
Both trade unions and civil society groups
organised demonstrations against increases in public
utility tariffs, and planned privatizations of national
banks.63 Public opinion turned against the free-market
economic paradigm, with 51 per cent of Argentines
feeling the country was going in the wrong direction,
while only 15 per cent were satisfied with the market
economy.64 Public opinion, associating privatization
with this model, displayed remarkable dissatisfaction.
When asked if privatization had been beneficial, only
12 per cent of Argentines agreed.65
Even conservative newspapers such as El Páis,
began criticising privatization as viable policy,66 while
former Brazilian President Cardoso, who oversaw the
privatization of many Brazilian state enterprises,
claimed the economic crisis in Argentina was due to
excessive
liberalisation,
including
excessive
privatizations.67 With agents agreed on the inadequacy
of the current policy, ideational collapse had occurred.
Nestor Kirchner, although a member of the
ruling Partido Justicialista (PJ), ran in the 2003
election on a platform attacking neoliberalism, and the
policy of privatization that had characterised Argentina
under Menem.
Three of the four presidential
candidates argued for greater state regulation.68 During
the
campaign
Kirchner
criticized
previous
privatizations, arguing that ‘it’s necessary to recover the
railways, and analyze the [privatization] contracts.’69
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Kirchner’s calls for renationalisation created jitters
on capital markets. Share prices fell 8.6 per cent on
the Argentine exchange when it became evident that
Kirchner would win the May run-offs.70 Kirchner
argued for revision of all privatization contracts.71
Kirchenr openly attacked Menem’s privatization of
state oil company YPF.72 The electorate echoed
these sentiments, with over half supporting the renationalisation of privatised firms.73
There was a clear alternative to
privatization. When the economy collapsed in 2001,
agents began criticising the conservative free-market
economic model and privatization. Public opinion
swung against privatization and this, along with
media and commentators’ criticisms, ensured
ideational collapse. Kirchner presented himself as a
change agent who could inject new ideas into the
policy domain. During the election an alternative to
privatization was presented, around which agents
coalesced.
This involved the halting of
privatizations, the re-nationalisation of companies
considered essential for the public good, and, where
necessary, public-private partnerships rather than
wholesale privatizations.
Kirchner, once these
alternatives had been consolidated, was, with election
victory in 2003, charged with the task of attempting
to pierce the armoured policy of privatization.
Table 4 – The Identification of Ideational Change

entrepreneur, proposed an alternative idea to
privatization, namely re-nationalisation, leading to
ideational change. However, as events in Brazil did not
constitute an economic crisis, the framework did not
lead us to anticipate finding ideational change.
Although privatization policy was challenged there, no
alternative was consolidated, and consequently,
ideational change did not occur.
The next section tests for radical changes in
privatization policy. Based upon the results so far, the
framework leads us to anticipate finding radical policy
change in Argentina, but not Brazil. This prediction is
based upon Argentina experiencing economic crisis,
and ideational change, while Brazil did not.
4.3 IDENTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN
GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC POLICY
The final issue is discovering if there were radical
changes in privatization policy. The observables here,
as developed by Hogan and Doyle (2007), are based
upon Hall’s concept of first, second and third order
change (1993). Hall (1993: 291) argued that policy
failures, and exogenous shocks, can set off processes
that lead to great ideational change, resulting in a reexamination of the belief systems through which policy
has been generated – a paradigmatic (third order)
change. These observables incorporate the notion of
swift change developed by Hogan (2005), and enable us
differentiate both normal and fundamental shifts in a

The Observable Implications
Ideational Collapse
O1. Media questioning efficacy of current model and/or specific policy areas.
O2. Opposition parties critique current model and propose alternative ideas – at
elections their platform are built around these alternative ideas.
O3. Civil society organisations critique the current model, reflecting Hall’s
coalition-centred approach.
O4. Widespread public dissatisfaction with current paradigm, observable through
opinion polls, protests etc.
O5. External or international organisations critique current model or, actively
disseminate alternative economic ideas.

Arg
99-02

Brazil
98-00

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Y
Y
New Ideational Consolidation
O6. A clear set of alternative ideas are evident
X
O7. A clear change agent (political entrepreneur) to inject these new ideas into
X
policy arena is evident
O8. Political Entrepreneur combines a mixture of interests to produce consensus
X
around a replacement paradigm
Adoption of New Idea
YES
NO
country’s policies. As we are dealing with the concept
Of the case studies, only Argentina constituted an
of a critical juncture we must assume change is fast. As
economic crisis. Following this crisis, there was
we are searching for a paradigm shift in policy this
widespread criticism of privatization policy. As
must encompass the below observables.
Table 4 shows, all observable implications were
O1. If privatization policy instrument settings changed
satisfied, confirming extant ideational collapse, and
(swiftly) there may have been a radical change in
new ideational consolidation. Kirchner, as political
government privatization policy.
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O2. If the instruments of privatization policy changed
(swiftly) there may have been a radical change in
government privatization policy.
O3. If the hierarchy of goals behind privatization
policy changed (swiftly) there may have been a
radical change in government privatization policy.
Brazil
Once elected, it appeared Lula wanted to disembed
privatization policy, and translate the economic ideas
of his campaign into policy. He announced the
government wished to renegotiate contracts with
privatised electricity companies74, and Dilma
Rousseff, the Mining and Energy Minister, unveiled a
working group to advise the government on
regulatory issues relating to privatizations.75 This
came amidst rumours the government was
considering re-nationalising Eletropaulo, the
country’s biggest power distributor.76 José Dirceu,
PT Chief of Staff, stated that the period of
privatization was over, although the government
would not re-nationalise former state-owned
companies.77
However, with the PND still in place, and
under pressure from the IMF on debt repayments, in
December 2003 Lula announced the privatization of
Banco de Estado de Maranhao, and three regional
banks.78 Shortly thereafter, Minister of Transport
Alfredo Nacimento announced the PT would
privatise seven motorways.79 Lula came under fire
from the media, the electorate, and elements of the
PT for what appeared to be maintenance of
privatization policy.
In response to his critics Lula passed decree
MP 144/03, excluding federal government-owned
electricity companies from privatization.80
He
created the Empresa de Pequisa Energetica (EPE),81
a company responsible for long term energy
expansion plans, and which reduced the autonomy of
the regulator. This marked an increased role for the
state in the energy sector. Lula, desperate for
infrastructural investment, re-iterated that the
government no longer supported wholesale
privatization of state-owned enterprises, but favoured
mixed models,82 with ownership remaining in state
hands. This indicates that Lula shifted policy
somewhat. In December 2004 he approved the
Public Private Partnership Bill (PPP), wherein
wholesale privatization of state-enterprises would
cease. Instead, private firms would invest in stateowned-enterprises, which would remain in state
hands. This came on the back of Plano Plurianual,
an investment strategy requiring 191 billion reais
(US$65.7 billion) for priority infrastructure.83
Lula, under IMF pressure, was forced to
privatise a number of state banks, something he had
promised not to do.
However, he increased

government involvement in sectors he considers
crucial. Although the PPP bill is, to an extent, a
product of the old privatization policy, it indicates a
shift towards capitalisation of state-owned enterprises,
with the state retaining ownership; and in key sectors
such as energy, retaining control. However, outright
privatizations are still acceptable. In terms of the
previous privatization policy under Cardoso, the
instrument settings have changed, but the instruments
themselves, and the hierarchy of goals, remain the
same. As such, this constitutes a first-order change in
Brazilian privatization policy.
Argentina
Once elected, Kirchner began to disembed privatization
policy, appointing Daniel Azpiauzu, advisor to the
newly created Ministry of Federal Planning and Public
Works, to review private utility contracts. Azpiazu’s
report critiqued Argentina’s privatization process for
engendering social inequity.84 Additionally, Kirchner’s
Economy Minister, Roberto Lavagna, stated that a
number of state-owned banks, due for sale before the
election, would not be privatised.85 This, coupled with
the Financial Restructuring Unit, responsible for
reforms in the financial and banking systems, signalled
a shift towards interventionist government policies.86
Furthermore, Kirchner, under IMF pressure to
increase utility prices, announced his intention to
renegotiate public service contracts.
Decree No.
311/03, created the Public Service Contracts’ Analysis
and Renegotiation Unit, headed by Roberto Lavagna,
and Planning Minister Julio de Vido. This was to
analyse and renegotiate 61 privatization contracts
including water services, gas, and electricity.87 The
magnitude of this policy shift sent capital markets into
tailspin, forcing Interior Minister, Aníbal Fernández to
stress that Kirchner was not launching a socialist
revolution.88 Following reviews by the Public Service
Contracts’ Analysis and Renegotiation Unit, Kirchner
fined electricity companies 9 million pesos, for
‘unjustifiable cuts’ in service.89 In November, 2003, he
revoked the contract of Grupo Macri, who operated the
postal service, for failing to repay a debt of 296 million
pesos to the government.90 The postal service reverted
to state control, and has remained there.
In June 2004, Kirchner rescinded the contract
of rail operator Metropolitano SA91, which held the
concession on trains in Buenos Aires, arguing the
company no longer provided reasonable service. This
was followed by the creation of a state-owned oil
company, to increase government involvement in the
energy sector.92 This came amidst rumours that
Kirchner planned to renationalise oil firm Repsol-YPF.
Shortly thereafter, the government rescinded the radio
frequency concession to Thales SA93 and renationalised

13

Table 5 – The Identification of Change in
Government Economic Policy
The Observable Implications
O1. If privatization policy instrument settings changed there may have been a
radical change in privatization policy.
O2. If the instruments of privatization policy changed there may have been radical
change in privatization policy.
O3. If the hierarchy of goals behind privatization policy changed there may have
been a radical change in privatization policy.
Radical Change in Privatization Policy
the company, after it fell behind on the concession
fee. The government also took control of the San
Martín railway line and Enarsa energy holding.94
Finally, in August, the government revoked the
satellite licence of Nahuelsat SA, handing the project
to a state-run firm. The Argentine Communications
Secretariat stated the service was a resource to ‘be
used in the public interest.’95
Kirchner’s aggressive anti-privatization
policies, garnered him increasing support. Over 78
per cent of Argentines believed foreign owned
utilities should be nationalised.96 In 2005, Kirchner
fined three water and electricity companies for failing
to provide adequate services.97 In 2006, following
the decision by shareholders of the Suez group to pull
out of their water provision contract, due to tariff
freezes, Kirchner revoked the water-supply contract
of Aguas de Argentinas, which reverted to state
control.98
There has been a reversal of policy in
Argentina, with the ending of outright privatizations,
and re-nationalisations, specifically in the provision
of public goods. This indicates greater state control
in the economy, and outright control in areas
considered essential public services. The instrument
settings, the instruments themselves, and the
hierarchy of goals behind privatization policy,
embedded in Argentina under Menem, have changed.
This constitutes a third order change in Argentine
privatization policy.
As the situation in Brazil did not constitute
an economic crisis, the framework did not lead us to
anticipate finding either ideational change, or
paradigmatic change in privatization policy there, nor
did we. We conclude from our findings that, the
devaluation of the Real in 1999, and ensuing
economic difficulties, led to a first-order change in
privatization policy – no critical juncture.
We identified economic crisis and ideational
change in Argentina in 2001. According to the
framework ideational change is the differentiating
factor between crises that lead to paradigmatic policy
change, and those that do not. Thus, at the end of the
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Brazil
98-00
X

X
X
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previous section the framework led us to anticipate
finding a third order change in Argentine privatization
policy, which we identified in Table 5. According to
the three stage framework, economic crisis, ideational
change, and radical change in privatization policy
together constitute a critical juncture in Argentina’s
privatization policy.
5. CONCLUSION
Critical junctures are central to our understanding
institutional change (Pierson, 2004). However, until the
development of Hogan and Doyle’s (2007) framework,
the concept was postdictive. In their three stage
framework, a critical juncture consists of: crisis,
ideational change, and radical policy change, with
ideational change the crucial constituent. The paper
employed this framework on economic upheavals in
Brazil (1999) and Argentina (2001) to determine if
there were critical junctures in privatization policy.
Privatization policy was concentrated on as it is a
central tenet of conservative economic restructuring.
According to the framework, the deterioration
of the Brazilian economy in 1999 was not an economic
crisis. Instead of ideational change, there was minor
ideational collapse in relation to privatization policy.
As no alternative ideas were consolidated to replace
extant policy, the old ideas endured. In the absence of
ideational change there was a first order change in
Brazilian privatization policy. The 1999 economic
upheaval in Brazil did not lead to a critical juncture in
privatization policy.
The economic malaise in Argentina in 2001
constituted an economic crisis as defined by the
framework. Following this crisis, alternative ideas
were proposed to replace the existing policy of
privatization, and a clear change agent (Kirchner) was
identified.
Ideational collapse, and subsequent
consolidation of a new idea, was identified by the
framework.
Finally, a paradigmatic (third order)
change in privatization policy was uncovered. The
2001 crisis in Argentina resulted in ideational change,
followed by a radical change in privatization policy,
which, the framework considers a critical juncture.
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Previously, researchers would have had to
wait decades before ascertaining whether economic
upheavals resulted in critical junctures in a policy
area.
With this framework, researchers, after
identifying a crisis, need to discover if the ideas
underpinning their policy of interest have changed. If
there was ideational change they should be able to
predict a third order change in that policy is coming,
or, if it has already taken place, that it constitutes a
critical juncture. Alternatively, if there was no
ideational change they should be able to predict that
existing policy will endure. The framework, a
significant advance for political science, reasserts the
value of the critical junctures concept.
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Appendix A

Appendix B

Economic Crisis Observable Implications

Idea Generation Observable Implications
Ideational Collapse
O1. The media questions the efficacy of the
current model and/or specific policy areas.
O2. Opposition political parties critique the
current model and propose alternative ideas – at
election time their platform will be built around
these alternatives.
O3. Civil society organizations, e.g. labour
unions, employer organizations, consumer groups
etc. critique the current model, reflecting Hall’s
(1989: 12) coalition-centred approach.
O4. Widespread public dissatisfaction with the
current paradigm, observable through opinion
polls, protests etc.
O5. External or international organizations
critique the current model and/or actively
disseminate alternative ideas.

O1. If annual GDP growth (Pei and Adesnik,
2000); GDP growth per capita; and GDP growth
averaged over 5 years were stagnant or negative,
then the economy may have been in crisis.
O2. If GNI per capita ppp growth was stagnant or
negative, then the economy may have been in
crisis.
O3. If more that 50 per cent of the population were
below the poverty line, hen the economy may have
been in crisis.
O4. If total debt as a percentage of GNI was above
100 per cent, then the economy may have been in
crisis.
O5. If debt services exceed 100 per cent of
exports, then the economy may have been in crisis.
O6. If the importation of goods and services; and
the level of trade openness declined, then the
economy may have been in crisis.
New Ideational Consolidation
O7. If FDI inflows, and FDI inward stock
O6. A clear set of alternative ideas, developed by
declined, then the economy may have been in
policy entrepreneurs, are evident.
crisis.
O7. A clear change agent (political entrepreneur)
O8. If gross capital formation as a percentage of
injecting new ideas into the policy arena is
GDP declined, then economy may have been in
evident.
crisis.
O8. The Political Entrepreneur combines a
O9. If the annual inflation rate was above 15 per
mixture of interests to produce consensus around a
cent (Pei and Adesnik, 2000), then the economy
replacement paradigm
may have been in crisis.
O10. If the annual interest rate was above 15 per cent, then the economy may
have been in crisis.
O11. If the annual unemployment rate was above 15 per cent, then the economy
may have been in crisis.
O12. If the country’s credit rating, as measured by independent agencies (S&P,
Moody, Fitch) declined, then the economy may have bee
O13. If corruption and government effectiveness are perceived to be problems,
then the economy may have been in crisis.
O14. If opinion polls regarded the economic in crisis, then the economy may have
been in crisis.
O15. If the national media regarded the economy in crisis, then the economy may
have been in crisis.
O16. If economic and political commentators regarded the economy in crisis,
then the economy may have been in crisis.
O17. If the central bank regarded the economy in crisis, the
been in crisis.
O18. If both domestic and international organisations (Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD)) regarded the economy in crisis, the
economy may have been in crisis.
O19. If elected representatives regarded the economy in crisis, the economy may
have been in crisis.
O20. If government pronouncements on the economy were consistent with a
crisis management approach, the economy may have been in crisis.
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